

Message Text

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USCINCEUR
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
AMEMBASSY MADRID
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

S E C R E T USNATO 5680

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: NATO, PFOR
SUBJECT: THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE AND ISSUES BEYOND ITS TRADITIONAL
AREA OF CONCERN

SUMMARY: DID THE SIGNATORS REALLY MEAN WHAT WAS SAID ABOUT ALLIED CON-

SULTATIONS IN THE ATLANTIC DECLARATION? IF SO --AND IF WE STILL DO--
THEN WE NEED TO THINK HARD ABOUT CONSULTATIONS ON BROADER CHALLENGES
TO ALLIED INTERESTS OUTSIDE THE TRADITIONAL EAST-WEST FOCUS OF
ALLIANCE CONCERNS. IN ALLIED CAPITALS, LEADERS ARE PREOCCUPIED TO
THE POINT OF OBSESSION WITH THREATS TO THE
SOCIETIES THEY GOVERN--THREATS THAT ARE NOT SOVIET IN ORIGIN OR
MILITARY IN NATURE. HOW MUCH INFORMATION DO WE AND OUR ALLIES WANT
TO SHARE ABOUT THESE ISSUES? HOW CAN WE USE NATO TO EXCHANGE IDEAS
ON THESE ISSUES? END SUMMARY

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1. THE ALLIES "ARE FIRMLY RESOLVED TO KEEP EACH OTHER FULLY
INFORMED AND TO STRENGTHEN THE PRACTICE OF FRANK AND TIMELY
CONSULTATIONS BY ALL MEANS WHICH MAY BE APPROPRIATE ON MATTERS
RELATING TO THEIR COMMON INTERESTS AS MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE,

BEARING IN MIND THAT THESE INTERESTS CAN BE AFFECTED BY EVENTS
IN OTHER AREAS OF THE WORLD."

2. THAT IS WHAT THE ATLANTIC DECLARATION SAID: "CONSULTATIONS ON MATTERS RELATING TO THEIR COMMON INTERESTS". BUT IF WE STEP BACK FROM IT, AND FROM THE COMMITMENTS WE MADE AT THAT TIME ON CONSULTATIONS--WE RECOGNIZE THAT THESE HAVE ALWAYS BEEN THE MOST DIFFICULT FOR THE ALLIES ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ATLANTIC TO CARRY OUT. THIS WILL CLEARLY BE THE CASE WITH SOME OF THE ISSUES THAT THREATEN ALLIANCE INTERESTS TODAY. THE FUTURE OF SPAIN, PORTUGAL, GREECE AND YUGOSLAVIA, THE ENTIRE SOUTHERN LITTORAL, THE MIDDLE EAST, INFLATION, UNEMPLOYMENT, THE SUPPLY OF ENERGY AND FOOD, TERRORISM--THESE ARE TODAY'S CONCERNs THAT INCREASINGLY PREOCCUPY ALLIED CAPITALS.

THESE ISSUES BEAR DIRECTLY ON ALLIANCE SECURITY, BUT ARE OUTSIDE THE TRADITIONAL EAST-WEST FOCUS OF THE ALLIANCE.

3. THE FIFTEEN MEMBERS OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION HAVE PROVEN THAT THEY CAN DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH FAMILIAR ISSUES IN PARTICULAR MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND NEGOTIATIONS RELATED TO THE SOVIET THREAT AND THE EVOLUTION OF DETENTE. PERHAPS THEY COULD DEAL WELL WITH

DEVELOPMENTS OUTSIDE THIS NARROW FOCUS IF THEY WERE DOCILE AND SIMPLY FOLLOWED U.S. ORDERS--WHICH THEY ARE NOT AND WILL NOT. CONSEQUENTLY, ALLIED ACTIONS ON DEVELOPMENTS OUTSIDE THE TRADITIONAL FOCUS OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY--EVEN THOSE THAT BEAR HEAVILY ON THE POLITICAL AND SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE TREATY AREA--WILL NOT BE COORDINATED UNLESS THE ALLIANCE MAKES A GREATER EFFORT TO FORESEE AND

DEVELOP APPROACHES TO SUCH ISSUES.

4. PART OF THE DIFFICULTY IS THE POLITICAL RELUCTANCE OF SOME
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NATO MEMBERS TO CONSULT OR TO DO CNTINGENCY PLANNING IN NATO ON WHAT THEY REGARD AS "NON-NATO" ISSUES. SOME INSIST NORTH AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN PERCEPTIONS AND INTERESTS DIVERGE AND THUS ONLY STRICTLY CONSTRUED EAST-WEST MILITARY MATTERS SHOULD BE ON THE ALLIANCE AGENDA. OTHERS RECOGNIZE THE NEED FOR A COORDINATED APPROACH TO THESE NEW CHALLENGES BUT INSIST IT BE IN OTHER FORUMS. BUT PART OF THE PROBLEM IS THAT, EVEN WITHIN POLITICALLY AND GEOGRAPHICALLY ACCEPTABLE PARAMETERS, MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE HAVE RARELY EXCHANGED VIEWS ON HOW THEY MIGHT REACT TO POSSIBLE CRISES. WHEN NEW ISSUES ARISE THAT MEMBER GOVERNMENTS HAVE NOT DECIDED IN ADVANCE TO WORK ON TOGETHER, THEY CANNOT SUDDENLY TAKE EFFECTIVE CONCERTED ACTION FROM A DEAD START. OCTOBER 1973 AND JULY 1974 BORE WITNESS TO ALLIANCE INABILITY TO ACT IN CONCERT ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND CYPRUS. TO A CERTAIN EXTENT THE CHARGE OF FAILURE IN THESE TWO CRISES IS A BUM RAP SINCE IT IS UNREASONABLE TO EXPECT THE ALLIANCE TO RESPOND TO SITUATIONS WITH WHICH THE MEMBERS ARE NOT FULLY AWARE AND WITH WHICH IT IS NOT PREPARED TO DEAL, PARTICULARLY WHEN TWO

SOVEREIGN MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE ARE INVOLVED. BUT THE
ALLIANCE HAS NOW HAD RECENT VIVID DEMONSTRATIONS OF THE NEED TO ADJUST
TO NEW CIRCUMSTANCES.

5. NEW ERUPTIONS WILL OCCUR. WE KNOW THIS.
THE QUESTION IS HOW CAN THE UNITED STATES EXERCISE LEADERSHIP
SO THAT THE NATO MECHANISM CAN BE USED TO DRAW OUT ALLIES,
TO EXCHANGE IDEAS, AND TO PREPARE WITH OUR PARTNERS FOR AT LEAST SOME
OF THE POTENTIAL CRISES BEFORE THY OCCUR? WILL WE DEVELOP OA INFORMA-
TION BASE ABOUT WHAT ALLIES ARE LIKELY TO DO INDIVIDUALLY, IF NOT AS
AN ALLIANCE, ABOUT THEES EVOLVING THREATS TO ALLIANCE INTERESTS?
WILLWE TAKE STEPS TO INSURE THAT, AT A MINIMUM, IF MEMBER COUNTRIES
CAN
NOT WORK TOGETHER IN CRISIS SITUATIONS, AT LEAST THEY WILL NOT WORK
AT CROSS PURPOSES OR INHIBIT THE OTHERS FROM WORKING TOGETHER.

6. FOR A QUARTER OF A CENTURY NATO ALLIES HAVE MEDITATED AND SOUL-
SEARCHED--WE HAVE PRONOUNCED, DENOUNCED, AND COMPROMISED--ON THE
QUESTION OF CONSULTATIONS, AND WE HAVE STILL NOT FOUND ENTIRELY
SATISFACTORY ANSWERS. NOR HAVE WE FOUND THEM IN THESE PAST TWO YEARS.
CONSULTATION IS, INHERENTLY AND ALWAYS ONLY A RELATIVELY SUCCESS-
FUL PROCESS. BUT SOME NEXT STEPS SEEM CLEAR:

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A. THE U.S. MUST CONTINUE TO PRESS IN EXISTING NATO FORUMS
FOR CONSULTATIONS ON MAJOR ISSUES WHICH MAY LIE BEYOND THE ALLIANCE'S
TRADITIONAL AREA OF CONCERN. WE MUST ALSO TRY TO MAKE GREATER USE
OF THESE FORUMS TO IDENTIFY FUTURE ISSUES AND DEVELOP INCREASED
FAMILIARITY WITH NEW CHALLENGES.

B. WE WILL ALSO NEED TO REMAIN ALERT TO THE POSSIBILITY OF
DISCUSSING SOME NEW ISSUES AT NATO IN STUDY GROUPS OR IN
AD HOC GROUPS. I DO NOT MEAN A PROLIFERATION OF FORMAL ACTIVITIES,
BUT RATHER A RECOGNITION THAT WE NEED NOT DISCUSS ALL ISSUES IN
THE NAC OR SPC, AND NOT NECESSARILY AT FIFTEEN.

C. AN ESSENTIAL TASK IN THE PROCESS WILL BE FOR WASHINGTON
TO IDENTIFY MAJOR ISSUES THAT MAY AFFECT THE ALLIANCE AND
DECIDE HOW MUCH WE CAN DO AND SHOULD DO AT NATO ON THESE
ISSUES.

D. A FIRST STEP MIGHT BE A POST MORTEM WITHIN THE USG OF
THE RECENT MIDDLE EAST AND CYPRUS CRISES TO SEE WHAT DIFFERENT
ACTIONS, IF ANY, COULD HAVE BEEN TAKEN BY THE ALLIANCE OR INDIVIDUAL
MEMBERS TO AFFECT THE COURSE OF EVENTS. THIS MIGHT HELP IDENTIFY
WHAT MODIFICATIONS OUR CONSULTATION PROCESS WILL NEED TO ACT SWIFTLY
AND DECISIVELY.

E. ANOTHER STEP MIGHT BE TO GAME A HYPOTHETICAL CRISIS:
FOR EXAMPLE, THE PRESENT SITUATION IN PORTUGAL DETERIORATES.
SPAIN MOVES TO STRENGTHEN HER POSITION ALONG THE COMMON FRONTIER.

WHAT WOULD WE WANT TO TELL OUR ALLIES ABOUT HOW WE WOULD REACT?
WHAT WOULD WE WANT TO KNOW ABOUT WHAT OUR ALLIES MIGHT DO?

7. IN SHORT, THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIES WILL NOT AUTOMATICALLY ENGAGE
IN SUCCESSFUL CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION, AS THE OTTAWA ATLANTIC
DECLARATION SAYS THEY ARE RESOLVED TO DO. THEY MUST BE INSPIRED
AND LED TO TRANSLATE THEIR DECLARED RESOLVE INTO PRACTICE.
THE USG SHOULD INTENSIFY EFFORTS TO IDENTIFY
TODAY'S ISSUES AND PREOCCUPATIONS AND TAKE INITIATIVES TO
DEVELOP BETTER WAYS FOR ALL OF US TO DEAL WITH THEM
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